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1WORLDMAKING WITH OBJECTS: 
A CASE IN SEMIOTIC ENGINEERING
1. Introduction.
In the new world of computer media, computer games and interactive video it is a
common experience for many users that some games, videos and software applica-
tions are more attractive than oth ers. Even for those who are not familiar with com-
puters and the new media, the same kind of experience is known for movies  or books.
Apart from the fact that some games, movies  or books are more exciting than others
because they are, for example, about sex, violence or adventure, the phenomeno n
remains that in some computer games or computer applications there seems some
magic element that does something with the player or user. An example of a
successful game is Doom (figure 1).
figure 1: Snapshot from Doom, an adventure program for kids
2The aim of this game is to destroy the enemy. On the one hand  the game corresponds
to everyday experiences of the player. All kinds of objects and phenomena fro m
reality appear in the game, such as a 3-D world, walls, characters, good and bad ,
weapons and light and dark. It is as if the player is in a real world. On the other hand
there also are phenomena that only exist in a dream world, such as monsters, laser
weapons and unlimited killing. The combination of real and fantastic propertie s
stimulates the player and makes him feel engaged. The question is: is this the case;
what is going on, here?
Another fact is that since the invention of the computer, its applicatio n
domain has grown immensely. Starting from number crunching and computation in
the early fifties the computer is now used for design, for all kinds of communication
and for the support of intelligent tasks and shortly the computer also will be used for
three dimensional experiences. From a communication or interaction point of view
the most important part of the computer is the user-interface. In fact, it is the only
part of the computer users normally get familiar with. It is the communication part
of the system and it expresses the inter nal structure of the handling of the task in the
computer and the behaviour that is asked for from the user. However it is still the
case that much software has a semantic gap between what the user wants and what
the computer offers. Many reasons may be given for this, but an important one is that
the computer developed from an e xtension piece of the foregoing task handling into
an instrument that can be  conformed to the needs of a user. The first wave of infor-
mation systems consisted in programming the admin istrative office and the financial
administration. This was mainly done on main frames. Although the rise of th e
personal computer changed the scale of automation, it did not change the startin g
point of automation. This point consisted in imitating the existing  manual procedures,
into the software. A word processor was designe d as a typing machine with a couple
of extensions such as manipulating and reordering existing texts. Software tha t
supported book-keeping or accounting was a continuation of the older task ad ded with
new features, such as classifying, ranking or comp aring. The reason for this was that
in earlier times - only twenty years ago - the technical shortcomings of compute r
systems required users to adapt themselves to the computer. This imperfection i s
rapidly disappearing. Most software companies now promise to integrate the user
perspective, although recently an advertisement of a certain computer firm  sarcasticly
3guaranteed that they would even make people compatible. Our statement is that in
the future software will be adapted to the user, or it will not be. The problem ,
however is that nobody really kno ws what it means "to be adapted to the user". Key
words that feature in discuss ions about new software developments include interac-
tive, attention oriented, game-oriented or intelligent support. One direction thi s
development is taking, starts from the window perspective. This can be illustrated
by a comparison of the old v ersion of SPSS (a statistical package for the behavioral
sciences) and the new version under windows (figures 2A and 2B). 
SPSS-windows works as a memory aid for the user, it facilitates input and output
manipulation, it enables loosely workin g and makes interaction of program and user
concrete.
figure 2A: DOS interface of SPSS
4figure 2B: Windows interface of SPSS
The Dos version, on the contrary, requires precision because of t he command
structure. The communication protocol is more explicit and more rigid. Although the
Windows version really is a st ep forward, we do not really know whether this is the
direction we want to go in user-interaction. Part of the problem we are discussing
here, is that question as wel l as answer are vague. Apart from the before mentioned
phenomena the issue is whether we really know what is meant with adequate user-
orientation. We will postpone the answer.
The examples of the thrill or excitement in some new computer games and
the dead end street in which many software developers find themselves - implying
an acknowledged failure of many existing programs - asks for a conceptual an d
theoretical analysis of the "why" and the "how further" of this situation. As already
5said, what is really going on here? Why is it that less effort has to be put in playing
some games, that less mistakes are made and that the attention continues to be cap-
tured in some applications? Is it possible to analyze and catch the determinin g
factors? Is the phenomenon known from other areas? Do cognitive psychologists,
for example, have answers?
Describing and classifying the phenomenon, however, is not enough. One
also needs a conceptual framework to get hold on the features of the phenomenon
and more important to manipulate these features in such a way that (the illusion of)
control is present. We propose a semiotic framework in which questions abou t
communication, meaning, user- orientation and sign usage have a natural place. The
semiotic perspective is especially important in relation to the interpretation of signs
as they are relevant in dealing with exciting computer games and so called user -
centered software. We come back t o semiotic issues and semiosis when we discuss:
a) object-oriented analysis and design, 
b) objects and worldmaking and 
c) the way we communicate with and within (virtual) worlds.
  The leading theme in this article is an answer to the question why some computer
games and computer applications seduce many users to behave as if they were in real
life. Part of the answer may be found in the metaphor of worlds in which actor s
behave in a natural way. This "world metaphor" must be contrasted with what has
been called the "conversation metaphor" that is usually taken for granted in getting
things done with computers . Another part of the answer may be that the excitement
of some games and applicati ons create an environment in which what Laurel called
"first-person experiences" show to full advantage. In contrast with third-perso n
experiences, first-person experiences invite to direct, that is to say non-computa -
tional, interaction with software environments. Again another part of the answer may
be related to the cognitive architecture of regular users. It is a well known fact that
people do not like to work with notations that require precision and rigidity. Users
try to minimize their menta l work load. Most times, conventional software requires
the opposite, that is to say demand precision and lead to heavy mental work load.
The answers of the kind of metaphor, first person experience and cognitive
architecture will be elaborated in section 2. Furthermore, it is always interesting to
look for similar developments in neighbouring domains. In designing and program-
6ming domains a major issue is the perspective on the programming ideology .
Nowadays, it is old fashioned to work only within a procedural paradigm. Modern
insights prescribe an object-oriented view. This is viewed to be more in agreement
with the way we see the real world. Object-orientation as an explanation for th e
easiness of window applications and certain computer games will be the topic o f
section 3. Apart from the discussion about object-orientation, we also will go into
the details of the shortcoming s of this orientation. We will relate this to the view on
worldmaking advocated by Nelson Goodman.
In section 4 we will evaluate what may be gained from the object-oriented
view on developing computer games and applications. What does the wor ld metaphor
and the view that we are dealing with objects bring us, so that we may understand
and manipulate its advantages for developing new software (and games)?
In the last section we will come to conclusion s related to semiotic questions.
What is the relevance of semiotics in the new worlds of virtual objects and virtual
space? What will be the nature of communication in the metaphor of worlds an d
objects? What is semiotic about it? What are the consequences of this perspective
for ontological engineering and, what we called, semiotic engineering? What is the
sign-oriented character of being in worlds? We do not have final answers, but w e
think that an integration of research from user centered design, information system
development, cognitive science and semiotics is required.
72.1 1st personness and 3rd personness
In taking an interface as mimesis, Laurel (1986) uses notion s from drama and theater
to show what makes computer interfaces different from each other. In quotin g
Aristotle she says that the end cause of a thing is the function that it is intended to
serve: that is what it is supposed to do (p.  68). A play may be used to inform people,
to teach them lessons or to make them contemplate. It fails to do so, if the audience
is not engaged in the play its elf. In the same way, a computer program may be used
to search for data, to design a new car or to have a user edit an article. If, however,
its interface does not engage me, does not in a certain sens e bewitch me, a successful
interaction will not appear. The key notion, according to Laurel, is mimesis. "It is
a certain kind of representation. It is a made thing, not an accide ntal, or arbitrary one:
using a pebble to represent a person is not mimetic, using a doll is." (p. 70). From
a semiotic point of view, at least in the Peircean sense, this  implies that, for example,
icons approach the ideal of mimesis more than symbols. Apple and the Microsoft
Corporation intuitively followed this road in developing the windows and ico n
environment on PC's.
A mimesis is a closed system, s ays Laurel, and for that reason it is theoreti-
cally completely knowable. Therefore the actions in a play follow logically. A new
situation in the play may appear, but it is within the scop e of the possibilities. A nice,
gentle and charming person does not suddenly change into a sc oundrel, unless hidden
clues are present earlier in the character of the person. Th e same holds for interfaces.
If they are mimetic, users a re not supposed to wonder why certain messages appear
on the screen or why certain commands are not executed. Looking at the man y
interfaces that are all around us, we may conclude that this mi metic situation is never
reached. The question is not only why this is the case, but also how the more ideal
situation can be realized.
Beside the mimetic aspect wi th its consistency, closedness and its complete
knowability, the user interface has on e very important extra dimension: it is interac-
tive. An interface, says Laurel, "is literally co-created by its human user every time
it is used. The interface represents a whole interaction." (p. 73) User and computer
should build up an interplay making up a new reality in which the user should b e
8engaged. The important remark is "should", because mostly non e of this is true. Take
the following example from Microsoft Windows (figure 3). 
figure 3: An ambiguous message on a Windows interface 
(courtesy Han Numan)
A user is executing a program. The reply in a window is: "Aborting the program .
Continue?" and a "Yes" button and "No" button (Numan, 1995). Such a message is
ambiguous, offensive and frustrating. It closes every form of engagement. It makes
completely obvious that in  such a situation a priority switch appears from doing the
task, for example word processing, to handling the computer system and the s oftware.
As Laurel says: "End users are not interested in making a representation (like a
programmer); they want to move around inside one. The context in which they wish
to operate is the mimetic context." (p. 74). In line wit h Coleridge it can be stated that
a user should have "the willing suspension of disbelief (p. 76). The suspension o f
disbelief, however, is very fragile and very often the trust in a new (virtual) world
is very rapidly violated (Numan, 1995).
The ideal situation in the relationship between user and computer is called
first-personness (Laurel, p. 76). A user should consider himself to behave in a way
as if he continuously says: "I am going to ..." o r "I can make ...". In comparison with
first-personness, second-pers onness expresses itself in statements like "You have to
..." or "You should ...", whereas examples of third-personness are "She did so and
9so" or "She was doing ...". First-personness means that a user is i mmersed in a world,
that he or she is in it. Just as is the case in the movie Tron. In this movie a user is
watching a computer game in which the good and the bad fight each other an d
suddenly finds him self inside the computer. He is then in the game and may run a
risk of being shot at. Most present-day computer programs address users in th e
second-person or third-person mode. As some computer games show, a better way
of interaction is the first-person mode.
The important question is how can first-personness be operationalized i n
design principles. One aspect is very clear, that is the mimetic character of th e
representational scene a user finds him self in. Flight simulators or car simulators
are very good examples of these mimetic scenes. As Laurel says "first-personness
is enhanced by an interface that  enables inputs and outputs that are more nearly like
real-world referents, in all relevant sensory modalities. [...] In product-drive n
applications, new technologies are allowing researchers to replace indirect o r
symbolic representations and manipulations with direct, concrete ones; e.g. ,
physically pointing or speaking as opposed to typing, spatial and graphica l
representation of data as oppos ed to textual representation." (p. 77). There are other
aspects that fall under the heading of interaction. These aspects are interactiv e
frequency, interactive range and interactive significance.
Interactive frequency indicates how often a user is allowed to give input to
the system. One extreme is the situation in which the user is only allowed to press
one key or to have one response button on the screen. The other extreme is th e
situation in which the user is allowed to give input to the system any time, fo r
example by pressing the right mouse button or the escape key. As a response th e
program will halt and ask the user what to do.
In the interactive range the one extreme is the situation where a user ca n
choose between two options, fo r example, yes or no. On the other hand a very large
range may appear, for example, in the still not realized natural language interfaces
of computer systems.
Interactive significance is very hard to define. It has to do with the conse-
quences of the actions of the user on the whole. In some games or application s
choices have little consequences for the user, e.g., the difference in some wor d
processors between save  and continue and save and quit. Although the result seems
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very important, the only consequence in the case of a mistake is that a user has to
restart a program. The result has little significance. This is different in the situation
where the user has to choose between quitting without saving and quitting wit h
saving. Although the result has the same small interactive range as in the other two
options choice, the interactive significance is enormous. 
From the foregoing it may be clear that first-personness is the situation in
which the significance is high, the range is as large as possible and the frequenc y
nearly as high as in real life. It would be interesting to measure existing softwar e
according to these standards.
2.2 World metaphor and conversation metaphor
The here exaggerated difference between first-personness and third-person-
ness has major implications for interface design. The m essage from Laurel's analysis
is that first-personness is the situation for behaviour in the real world, whereas the
third-personness is mainly what is going on in settings where the communication is
with language-like structures. Norman (1986) expressed this difference in tw o
metaphors, the first called the "world metaphor", the other called the "conversation
metaphor".
Characteristics of the world metaphor are that it consists of objects, tha t
manipulation of objects is possible, that one can act as if one were in the world and
that one experiences a feeling of direct engagement. Its most emphatic aspect is its
directness. According to Hutchins, Hollan & Norman (1 986) the objects in the world
metaphor can match the intentions of th e user, but they also can be on a lower level.
The last situation leads to misunderstanding and unintended actions in the user -
interface. One may state that in such a case the level of granularity of user  and system
does not fit.
An example of this phenomenon in a completly different domain is th e
scheduling of nurses. Scheduling is defined as attuning staff and shifts. Two levels
can be discerned. At the higher level it is important to look whether there are suffi-
cient nurses to fulfill the required shifts. At a lower level it is important to assig n
individual nurses to specific shifts. Capacity control, i n fact the higher level, requires
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different information compared to the scheduling task itself, the lower level. This
distinction is very important for the ki nd of support that is necessary, and, therefore,
for the user interface (figure 4).
Properties of the conversation metaphor are that it is indirect, that is to say
a user has to make a mental model for communication , that it requires (complicated)
expressions to make things c lear and that it normally demands a rigid syntax. In the
conversation metaphor one also may distinguish several layers of granularity, that
may be called low and high level languages. There is little agreement betwee n
experts which metaphor is better in which situation, although the general feeling is
that a high level language in the conversation metaphor and direct manipulation in
the world metaphor give a better interface communication. Between the two ,
however, direct manipulation defeats high level languages. The reason this so metimes
does not work out has to do with the wrong approach or level of granularity of the
objects in relation to the intentions of the user.
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figure 4: Example of different lev els of granularity in designing scheduling support;
a: high level, b: low level
2.3 Experiential and reflective cognition
The distinction in world metaphor and conversation metaphor has stron g
semiotic and cognitive consequences. In the first place there is a contradistinction
in expressions and objects. Although both have shape, the differences are huge. On
the one hand there are syntactic and semantic structures, on the other hand there is
a spatial structure. A second aspect is the difference in reference. In the norma l
situation language expressions refer to something, whereas an object is its ow n
referent. In the third place there are differences in manipulation and construction.
Expressions can be formed out of elements, whereas objects are elements i n
themselves. The building blocks are rather clear in the language metaphor, but not
in the world metaphor. In  the fourth place the world metaphor and the conversation
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metaphor make an appeal to different cognitive abilities of the user. This las t
difference is more related to cognitive than to semiotic features.
The consequences of the world and c onversation metaphor for the cognitive
processing of the user can best be explained by referring to Norman's distinctio n
(1993) in kinds of cognition. Generally, it is well known that human memory i s
organized so that the gist of the matter is more easily stored and retrieved than the
details. Furthermore, humans are able to trace tasks attentively provided that there
are changes in the environment. Humans are very sensitive for disturbances, fo r
deviations in normal procedures a nd therefore can remember new things better than
familiar ones. Humans are also very good in pattern recognition. We are able t o
recognize faces, structures and textures, instan tly. More empirical findings about the
human cognitive system can be mentioned here, but that is not the point. Important
is that the differential effects can be attribu ted to differences in our cognitive system
(Norman, 1993).
The two kinds of cognition that are relevant here, are called: "experiential
cognition" and "reflective cognition" (No rman, 1993). Experiential cognition relates
to experiences and to perceptions one undergoes. The perceptual experience, felt in
all kind of modalities, leads to efficient performa nce. Reflective cognition, however,
is focused on deliberation, reasoning and thought. It is extremely relevant  for decision
making and problem solving.
The numerous events, happenings or occurrences in norma l life appeal to the
distinct kinds of cognition. So far so good. Humans have diffe rent kinds of cognition,
the world has many forms of appearances and the combination of the two result in
various kinds of more or less adequate behaviour. A s everyone knows this behaviour
is not without complications, but a new kind of complication shows u p when between
the world and the user, interfaces are constructed. This gives problems, not only, as
Norman (1988) and Rasmussen (1986) demonstrated, in the design and displays of
various machines, but the last ten or twenty years also in computer interfaces.
A complete mismatch appears if instr uments are designed that are supposed
to support a particular kind of task, but as a  matter of fact are related to another kind
of task. According to Norman this is the case if one uses experientially oriente d
interfaces for reflective tasks and reflection oriented i nterfaces for experiential tasks.
Stated in semiotic terms one can say that in these situations the structure and sign
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in the design of the interface hamper adequate semiosis (understanding). Norma n
gives several examples of these mismatches for computer and non-compute r
situations. Firstly, experiential instruments that do not  fit experiential cognition, such
as car radio's that wrongly require a lot of reflection. Secondly, reflective instruments
that do not fit reflective cognition. An example is software for d esigning and drawing
that does not support exploration, problem solving and compa rison. A "bad" example
is Slide Write, a "good" example Corelflow. Thirdly, an instrument ma y be important
for experiential behaviour, but leads to reflection. A "d angerous" example is a button
for forced stop that cannot immedi ately be discerned from ten surrounding identical
buttons. One first has to think before one can act. Disasters may be the result.
Experiential and reflective cognition are related  to the before mentioned dis-
tinctions in first- and third-personness and world and conversation metaphor in a
special way. First-personness means that users are within a world, that interaction
is direct, in the sense of objects that can be manipulated. This very much suits the
cognitive mode of experiential cognition. On the other hand third-personness takes
distance between user and computer system for granted, which means that thinking
and deliberation are the cognitive mode users have to be in. This means that reflective
cognition is at work and that the conver sation metaphor naturally fits these interface
situations. Semiotic issues differ completely in both. On the one hand language ,
syntax and semantics are important, on the other hand objects, object manipulation
and the context of objects, the world, and the way we deal with these contexts. Until
now semiotics had much to say about language, syntax and reference, but there is
not much theorizing to be fou nd about objects, object making and context or world-
making. The only interesting development exists in an area that is far remote from
semiotics, namely object-oriented analysis and object-oriented design (Jacobson ,
1992). We will first discuss this new theoretical entry that seems so much in line with
the world metaphor and f irst-personness and then we will evaluate its relevance for
the analysis and design of new interfaces.
3.1 Worlds and object-orientation
15
The object-oriented approach  starts from the assumption that modelling software in
a computer system should correspond to reality. Those properties of the world that
are relevant for computer support are described as objects that are connecte d
together. As in every modelling system the primitives that are used are limited, but
the limitations are a result of the assumption about the way the world is.
The object-oriented approach has its origin in the computer environmen t
itself. A computer program consists of a static part that describes the state and a
dynamic part that changes the state. The static part is called the data structure ,
whereas the dynamic part is called the program structure or procedure. I n
conventional software, data and procedures are separated. This principle ha s
consequences for the modelling techniques that are used. M ost techniques emphasize
data or procedure, but not both. Emphasizing the o ne, necessarily leads to neglecting
the other. Entity relationship modelling is data structure oriented and neglects th e
dynamic aspects, whereas ISAC models the processing or procedural structure and
does not pay much attention to the static aspects of the modelled world. The object-
oriented approach wants to get rid of this forced divi sion and tries to model the static
and dynamic structure at the same time. An object is a structure of data an d
processes. Processes and data that belong together are called to be encapsulated.
As the name already indicates the central elements in object-oriented pro-
gramming are the objects. A computer program consists of several independentl y
acting objects that each manipulate their d ata with their own pieces of program. The
data structure of an object  consists of several attributes and the processing structure
consists of methods. Values on the attributes determine the state the object is in .
Methods change these states by execut ing operations on attributes. For example, the
method "open the throttle" of an obje ct "vehicle" changes the attribute "speed" from
"0" into "50".
In an object-oriented programming language a set of identical objects o r
tokens is described by a class or type. Classes are distinguished from each other ,
because they describe different attributes and methods. A difference between th e
classes "car" and "plane" is that the last one has wings. Objects or tokens of a class
are distinguished from each other because they have different values for common
attributes. Two tokens of the class "car" are distinguishable because they hav e
different number plates.
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Objects may be connected  with each other. Mostly the aggregation-relation
and the generalization-relation is modelled  (figure 5). 
Aggregation means that an object consists of several parts that are object s
themselves, such as a car that consists of  wheels, a motor, etc. In the generalization-
relation properties that different classes have in c ommon are described in a class one
level higher. Because the class at a lower level inherits the properties from a class
a level higher, the relation is called inheritance. Inheritance makes it easier t o
describe a new object because only that parts have to mo delled that are not described
in another class.
17
figure 5: Two different perspectives on the same object: 'car': generalisation an d
aggregation
As already stated, the object-oriented approach has a technical background.
The first object-oriented programming language was Simula, and afterward s
Smalltalk and C++ were introduced. It is sad to say but the emphasis in th e
development of object-oriented languages is on technical cleverness and not on the
semantic modelling power. As a resul t of this there was more interest in all kinds of
technical tricks that facilitate programming, whereas the modelling of objects i n
reality became more and more proble matic. This shortage was realized and resulted
in modelling techniques that could be used in the analysis phase of developin g
software. This adapted approach not only leads to a stepwise refinement of system
specifications, but is also important in the communication to the user. Still, thes e
models describe the computer system at several levels of abstraction instead o f
modelling reality as such.
We introduced the object-oriented approach as a possible answer for th e
development of more realistic interfaces and computer programs. The advantages
of this approach are clear. Because of the levels of abstraction, it is a better structured
programming tool and it offers better communicatio n possibilities with users. Levels
may be hidden or encapsulated, because they are not important for the overall view
of the application. It also  gives the possibility to reuse components that are built for
specific applications. Furthermore, t here is a direct relation between object-oriented
analysis, object-oriented design and object-oriented programming. And last but not
least the object-oriented approach cl aims to be more in line with the way people see
the world, namely in terms of objects, properties and classes.
However, it is also clear that there are several disadvantages, for example,
that the programming perspective is dominant. Furthermore, it is not clear what the
context of the objects is. Objects are located in a world, but the world is not stated
explicitly. We may say that an object-view not necessarily brings about a world-view.
In comparison with classical ways of designing and prog ramming software and user-
interfaces, the object-oriented approach is more than one step further towards first-
personness and the world metaphor in the sense of direct manipulation, but the final
goal has not yet been reached. Therefore, we suggest to have a look at a
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supplementary more philosophical perspective, called ways of worldmaking. This
perspective, proposed by Nelson Goodman, may give the extr a dimension the object-
oriented approach is missing. We then might have ways to conceptualize and t o
implement interfaces that are in the first-personness mode.
3.2 Objects and worldmaking
The shortcomings of the object-oriented approach are clear, although the overal l
perspective is welcomed. The question is what exte nsion can be found in Goodman's
ways of worldmaking. Goodman has two important starting points. Firstly, he claims
that we live in and make artifacts that may be called worlds. Worlds may be small
or large or extended or contracted, but they always are designed, constructed an d
man-made. Secondly, there are no a pri ori reasons that one world has priority above
another world. Therefore, truth is relative and depending on the way the world i s
made.
Ways of worldmaking is Goodman's answer to the questi on how to deal with
different versions or descriptions of phenomena and events. All these descriptions
may constitute "the" world. In practice we have to do with versions that constitute
a world and, according to Goodman, right versions constitute right worlds. Hi s
approach, he says, "is rather through an analytic study of types and functions o f
symbols and symbol systems. In neither case should a unique result be anticipated;
universes of worlds as well as worlds themselves may be built in many ways" .
(Goodman, 1978, p. 5). Worlds consist of matter, energy, waves and phenomena .
Worlds can be described in words. Here an asymmetry appears, because we cannot
have worlds without words, but we can have words without worlds. The important
question is: how can worlds be made, tested and known?
Goodman discerns five ways of worldmaking: a) composition and decomposition,
b) weighting, c) ordering, d) deletion and supplementation and e) deformation.
All worldmaking starts with composition and decompositio n. This means the
putting together of different entities, be it objects, classes, members or subclasses.
Goodman says that this process is normally done with names , categorizations, labels,
pictures and so on. When a hundred years ago soccer players acting in the world of
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football took the ball in their hand and r an towards the goal-line and pressed the ball
on the ground a new world was created, called rugby. This is a very down-to-earth
example, but many more sophisticated instances can be found. Many worlds ar e
created in a similar way.
Another part of worldmaking consists in weighting. This has to do with the
difference in emphasis on entities and properties that constitute a world. Two worlds
may have the same entities, for example, different kinds of cars, but in relation to
the purpose or function of these worlds, the distinctions in the first world go as far
as kind of model and year of manufacturing, whereas in the second world th e
important aspect is whether transportation is by ship, car or plane.
Ordering is a way of bringing specific structure into a world. Two identical
worlds consisting of the same entities, may differ in their ordering relation. I n
broadcasting a portrait of the queen, th e portrait may be an oil painting or a digitally
remastered image. The ordering of the elements in the first situation is not reall y
relevant. In the second si tuation, however, the ordering of the pixels, is decisive for
transmitting. Even the differen t ways of ordering within the digital environment are
important. This ordering can be vector-graphic, bitmap and so on. According t o
Goodman these orderings are not found in the world, they are built into the world.
The example of soccer changing into rugby also makes clear that compositio n
and decomposition naturally imply deletion and supplementation. Playing by foo t
was supplemented by playing by hand. Deletion and supplementation also become
clear in the kind of instruments we use. A digital thermometer, measuring i n
hundredth of degrees, has advantage over an old analog one measuring the human
body temperature more roughly. Another interesting example is the phi phenomenon.
Looking at two flickering points at a certain distance, giv es the impression of (appar-
ent) motion in the eye of the beholder (Goodman, 1978, p. 15). Something is sup-
plemented that is not really there.
Another less important process of worldmaking is deformation. This i s
involved in making corrections or distortions within existing worlds. Correcting a
digitally transmitted image is an example of positive deformation, adding a
moustache to the face of the Mona Lisa is an illustration of negative deformation.
Ways of worldmaking also make clear that it is rather indifferent to deter-
mine which world is the real world. All worlds are constructed, are artifacts, and,
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as such, there is no final frame of reference. However, this does not imply tha t
anything goes. The problem is, says Goodman, that we may have trouble with truth.
Truth still holds as a concep t to indicate whether versions and worlds correspond or
are consistent, but truth does not matter any more as the ultimate referee for al l
worlds. Truth already was a problem when a world contained no statements at all,
truth now is also problematic, because there is no ultimate reference. According to
Goodman, truth relates to the reality of a world and reality, he says, is largely a
matter of habit. This perspective has strong implications for the way we deal with
designing virtual worlds, object-oriented worlds in relation to the so calle d real world.
4. Conclusions: User-orientation, engineering and the semiotic consequences
Although having its predecessors in Wittgenstein and Winch, Goodman's project of
the ways of worldmaking was rather new in the seventies. Nowadays it is common
usage to make worlds, of cours e in a more technical sense than Goodman analyzed.
If we strip the details, modelling software and information systems is nothing bu t
worldmaking. We discussed this already in the object-oriented approach. What yet
cannot be found in this approach is the perspective that one is making worlds, that
one is composing, ordering, supplementing and deleting. In information science ,
computer science and cognitive science much may be gained from a sign-oriented
(semiotic) point of view as well as from Goodman's perception on worldmaking .
Object-orientation and worldmaking belong toge ther and both may be used to model
and understand first personness and the world metaphor in user interfaces.
Finally we have to answer the questions we asked about the "what" an d
"why" of the advantages of some games and software applications compared t o
others.
What is the relevance of semiotics in the new worlds of virtual objects and
virtual space? If the conclusion from the above is that perception, first-personness
and the world metaphor are c onceptually linked together, at first sight the answer is
very disappointing. Semiotics has little to offer, here. Truth, reference an d
communication structures are problematic features of directness, first-personness and
experiential cognition. However, if we connect the objects in th e worlds we construct
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with Goodman's ways of worldmaking, semiotics is of relevance, but not immedi ately
applicable.
The same ambiguous answer also holds for the qu estion what the nature will
be of communication in the metaphor of worlds and objects. Perception, directness
and first-personness ask for a different kind of communication than we are used to
in the language-like interp lay. The semiotic apparatus for this is missing. Semiotics
as the study of sign systems and sign use is inadequate. Conce pts that might give grip
on the feeling of directness and engagement relate to attuning and res onance, but how
this relates to semiotics is unclear.
The question of the sign-oriented character of being in worlds is therefore
very easy to answer. Worlds may consist of all kinds of build ing blocks, that is to say
objects or signs. We may reac t to signs in worlds; not in a communicational kind of
way, but like in actions. Furthermore, there is not one world, but there are many .
Acting in a world is not a ma tter of communication, but a matter of habit. Here, the
relevance of Goodman's ways of worldmaking is evident.
The discussion of the world metaphor, the ways of worldmaking and th e
construction of worlds in the case of information system development, interfac e
design and software applications also answe rs the question what kind of engineering
is suitable for user-centered interfaces and games. One might stick to the old idea
that artifacts resemble "the" world. Ontological engineering is coined as a label for
this approach. However, it is better to say that worlds are created and that feeling
well within a world is a matter  of used sign systems and therefore a matter of habit.
In this case we talk about semiotic engineering. Not because descriptions ar e
depictions, but because descriptions create depictions.
The contrast is eloquently stated by Lenat & Guha (1990) who call th e
application-oriented construction of systems of represent ation primitives: ontological
engineering. "Choosing a set of representation primitives (predicates, objects ,
functions) has been called ontological engineering  - that is, defining the categories
and relationships of the domain." (1990, p. 23). The process is caught in a language
called CYCL in which rules are specified for handling units (objects), slots, (predi-
cates, attributes), values, entries, kinds of slots, variables, propositional objects and
so on. In ontological engineering nature is carved on its edges in such a way tha t
objects, relations, agents, events, processes and so on are represented in a general
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language. The basic idea is that a world in all its complexity can be represented by
a finite set of language-like entities.
The most problematic aspect of ontological engineering is the assumption
of a basic ontology. In the construction of information systems, that is to sa y
databases, decision support systems and knowledge systems and, especially, use r
interfaces, the starting point of an ontology is questionable. What we find i n
organizations are constructs, artifacts and more or less complicated man-made sign
structures. None of this can be considered to be an ontology in a classical way. In
this sense building any kind of information system or user interface, does not presup-
pose an ontology, but creates a structure; a semiotic structure. 
Now, objects are signs, bu t not necessarily symbols. Larger fragments of words are
worlds. And worlds can be create d. In fact, they are created, for example in playing
computer games or in being engaged in adequate user interfaces. The theoretica l
underpinnings for worldmaking with object are clearly visible. It is time that more
practical applications become available.
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